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Litigation of Contested Corporate Elections
There are various ways in which an illegal or fraudulent election of directors of a corporation may be judicially investigated
and remedied. Such remedies are quo warranto, mandamus, or
a suit in equity. Each of these remedies, however, is beset with
delays, expenses, and technical difficulties. For example, quo
warranto and mandamus have been considered extraordinary
remedies and are a subject for the sound discretion of the
court. 1 A court may refuse these remedies even though the2
technical requirements for allowing them may be present.
Usually, courts will be loath to grant the extraordinary relief
afforded by quo warranto, except when the ultra vires acts,
as such, endanger the interests of the people, or where there has
been a radical departure from the spirit of the charter.3 If the
relator is not an "interested" party,4 and if there is another "adequate" remedy,3 quo warranto will not be permitted. In some
jurisdictions quo warranto proceedings may be brought only by
the attorney general ex officio.8 Limitations have also been put
on the use of a suit in equity in contesting elections. Whereas
a court of equity may prior to the holding of an election enjoin
such an election,7 a different rule prevails after the election has
actually taken place. A court of equity has no inherent power
or jurisdiction to entertain a bill for the purpose of reviewing a
corporate election and ousting the parties who claim to have
been elected unless the question arises incidentally in connection
with some other equitable matter.8 As a consequence, some jurisdictions have enacted statutes which are intended to afford more
speedy relief to a stockholder who may be aggrieved by a cor1People v. State Auditors, 42 Mich. 422, 4 N.W. 274 (1880); Attorney General v.
Erie Ry., 55 Mich. 15, 20 N.W. 696 (1884); Whitcomb v. Lockerby, 57 Minn. 411;
59 N.W. 495 (1894); People v. Gas Light Coke Co., 205 I1. 482, 68 N.E. 950
(1903); State v. Endowment Trust Co., 140 Ala. 610, 37 So. 442 (1904); State v.
Cupples Power Co., 283 Mo. 115, 223 S.W. 75 (1920).
sPeople v. State Auditors, 42 Mich. 422, 4 N.W. 274 (1880).
S State v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 225, 41 N.W. 1020 (1889).
4 State v. Point Roberts Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85 P. 22 (1906); State v. Union Hehrew
Congregation, 309 Mo. 587 274 S.W. 413 (1925).
5 People v. Mutual Gas Light do. 38 Mich. 154 (1878); People v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
130 App.Div. 626, 115 N.Y.S. 393 (1st Dept. 1909); Gardner Trust Co. v.
Whitehead Corp., 260 Mass. 239, 157 N.E. 519 (1927).
$Attorney General v. Adonai Shamo Corp., 167 Mass. 424, 45 N.E. 762 (1897);
Thirteenth Street Ry. v. Broad Street Rapid Transit Co., 210 Pa. 10, 67 A. 901
(1907); Sherwood v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 195 Iowa 365, 185 N.W. 279 (1921).
Chiera v. Breevoort, 97 Mich. 638, 57 N.W. 193 (1893).
'People v. Albany R.R., 57 N.Y 161 171 (1874)- New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, 6 N.E. 134 (1886); erry v. Tuskaloosa Cotton Seed Oil
93 Ala. 364, 9 So. 217 (1891).
Co., 93 Ala. 364, 9 So. 217 (1891).
'2 Cook, Corporations 1690 (6th ed. 1908).

porate election. 9 These statutes, unattended by the delays and
difficulties usually attributed to an ordinary suit in equity, mandamus, or writ of quo warranto, empower a court, sitting as a
court of chancery, to review an election, confirm the election,
order a new one, or make such order as it deems best. 10 A proceeding under these statutes is intended to furnish a simple, just
and effective remedy for all complaints, free from useless technicalities and unnecessary expense. In such proceedings the courts
are interested in the merits rather than in technique and procedural niceties."
The Virginia statute12 is confined to. controversies concerning "any election for directors, or any proceeding, act or matter
touching the same," and within this limitation, "the judge shall
proceed forthwith and in a summary way, to hear the allegations and proofs introduced by the parties, or otherwise inquire
into the matter," and to "give such relief in the premises as
right and justice may require." Contested elections are litigated
by a summary proceeding. The trial judges are allowed wide
discretion in the exercise of the power thus conferred. They
may and ought to be governed by equitable principles and
should deal with cases arising under the statute in accordance
with substantive right and justice, but they are not saddled to
any hard and fast legal or equitable rules.13
While the Virginia statute is clearly designed to eliminate
difficulties attending quo warranto, mandamus, or an ordinary
suit in equity, many problems arise which are not readily apparent. It is the purpose of this note to examine the problems that
face dissident stockholders in contesting elections under this
statute. In many instances it will be necessary because of the
20Stratford v. Mallory, 70 N.J.L. 294, 58 A. 347 (1904).
112 Cook, Corporations 1691 (6th ed. 1908).
12 Va. Code §13-205 (1950): "Any stockholder who may be aggrieved by, or complain
of, any election for directors, or of any proceeding, act, or matter touching the same,
may, after giving reasonable notice to the coroporation and to any person who is to
be affected thereby, otherw;se than as a stockholder only make application by petition
to the judge of the circuit court of the county, or of the circuit, corporation, or
chancery court of the city wherein the principal office in this State of such corporation is located, in term time or vacation, and the judge shall proceed forthwith
and in a summary way, to hear the allegations and proofs introduced by the parties,
or otherwise inquire into the matter, or cause of complaints, and thereugon establish
the election so complained of, or order a new election, or make such order and
give such relief in the premises as right and justice require. Pending the hearing
and determination of an application to investigate an election of directors, the judge
may,. by order, restrain the persons claiming to have been elected directors from
or duties of the office."
functions
any of
exercising
Pierce
Oil Corp.
v. the
Voran,
136 Va. 416, 118 S.E. 247 (1923).

paucity of the Virginia cases to view these problems in the
light of interpretations given in various decisions under similar
statutes and the opinions of Virginia judges interviewed. 14
No answer is to be found in the Virginia statute or in
Virginia cases as to when a stockholder who delays in complaining of an election may be barred of a remedy. The "reasonable
diligence" rule is rather uncertain and difficult to state. The
clearest examples of this problem are found in cases where a
shareholder wishes to attack the election after such a lapse of
time that the question of whether the stockholder has presented
some good excuse for delay in not doing so must be determined.
This issue was met squarely in Jones v. Bonanza,15 a Utah case.
The plaintiff after two years of inaction brought suit against the
defendants to enjoin them from acting as the officers and board
of directors, from holding certain stockholders' meetings and from
entering into negotiations for and from making a sale of the
property of the corporation. The lower court granted the relief
prayed for and further decreed that the plaintiff and his associates were still the owners of and entitled to the stock which had
been sold by the directors. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed. A stockholder who had the means of knowledge respecting all the circumstances of the sale of the corporation which
he now claims was illegal and failed to manifest any interest in
the annual stockholders' meetings although they were advertised
and publicly held as required by law cannot now complain. A
stockholder who applies to a court for its interference to protect
his rights against the consequences of alleged wrongful acts of
the directors or the legality of an election must act with reasonable diligence. The court's reasoning and conclusions are sound.
After such a time that the position of the parties is apt to be substantially changed and the shareholder has shown apathy or
inertia in bringing an action, there seems no apparent reason
why the courts should restore the contestor to his former rights.
In the final analysis, it is the contestor who must ride out many
a tumultuous election and be alert to act on his own Jbehalf.
The Virginia judges contacted 16 agree that the doctrine of
laches should govern. Each case is unique. Whether the con"Two Virginia judges who sit in heavily populated cities were consulted.
"32 Utah 440, 91 P. 273 (1907).
16 See note 14 suJra.

testing party knew he had a right, whether the rights of third
parties had intervened, whether undue delay was due to illness
or negligence, are all circumstances which should be carefully
considered by the court.
Under a statute similar to the Virginia one, an election may
be declared void by reason of the conspiracy, fraud, or trickery
of some of the stockholders.' 7 This problem was before the
Virginia Court in Pierce Oil Corp. v. Voran.'8 The charter of the
corporation provided that when four quarterly dividends of the
preferred stock were in default the voting power in the election
of directors should pass to the preferred stockholders. The preferred stockholders on default of preferred dividends asserted
their right to elect the directors. The corporation alleged that
the default in the preferred dividends was caused by fraud and
conspiracy on part of some of the preferred stockholders and
others to financially embarrass the corporation and force such default. Although it was not denied that four quarterly dividends
were in fact unpaid, the appellants alleged that the corporation
had ample surplus out of which the dividends could have been
paid and that therefore there was no default within the meaning
of the charter. On appeal, the Court held that whether the corporation had a surplus out of which the dividends could be paid
was immaterial, as the directors in passing the dividends had
acted in good faith. The Court, sensing the necessity for further
justifying their holding, concluded with the statement that' the
general rules of evidence as to fraud and conspiracy are well
understood. Direct proof is seldom obtainable and circumstantial evidence, when solely relied upon, must be clear and convincing. This case points up the acute difficulty of upseating the
elected directors on the ground of fraud or conspiracy. The
introduction of proof of fraud and conspiracy is necessarily to a
large extent a matter to be regulated by the sound discretion of
the judge, and finding nothing to indicate an abuse of that discretion, the Supreme Court of Appeals refused to reverse the
lower court's decision. Not only must a shareholder prove bad
faith, but the evidence must be so clear and convincing as to
entitle him to relief. However, there is ample justification for
1TPeople

v. Albany Ry., 55 Barb. 344, affirtd, 57 N.Y. 161 (1869).

1s 136 Va. 416, 118 S.E. 247 (1923).

exacting such evidence as the rule effectively safeguards corporate elections from the danger of sham claimants.
Another difficulty that is posed is whether a stockholder
may object to the legality of an election when he attends the
election, votes and does not object to those voting or exhibits
misconduct or neglect in regard to the election. This question
has been passed upon in several jurisdictions. 19 It was held in
the Chenango case20 that an illegal vote not challenged will not
invalidate an election, nor will an inquiry into it even be made.
Again in People v. Robinson21 it was said that a stockholder
who attends the election and votes and does not object to others
voting, although he knows that in doing so they are violating a
by-law, cannot himself afterwards object to the legality of the
election.
This question was peripherally before the Virginia Court in
Kemp v. Levinger.2 2 The charter provided that' so long as the
prior preference stock outstanding should be in excess of
$10,000,000 par amount, the holders of the prior preference
stock should have the right, voting separately as a class, to
elect a majority by one of the directors. Prior to the date of the
election, the corporation had purchased and held in its treasury
prior preference stock, which reduced the amount of prior preference stock in the hands of others to less than $10,000,000. The
chairman of the meeting declared that there was present in person or proxy a quorum of prior preference stockholders, but not
a quorum of preferred and common stockholders. He stated that
the holders of the prior preference stock had the right to proceed
with the election of a majority by one of the directors and that
for lack of a quorum of all the stockholders no other business
could be transacted. The prior preference stockholders thereupon proceeded to elect a majority by one of the number of
directors authorized. The contestor sought to enjoin the directors from functioning. The Supreme Court of Appeals in reversing the lower court's granting of an injunction said by way
of dictum:
9In

re Chenango County Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wend. 635 (N.Y.Sup. 1839); State v.
Lehre 7 Rich.Law 234 (S.C. 1854); People v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 373, 1 P. 156
(1883
:0I1 re CInengo County Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wend. 635 (N.Y.Sup. 1839).
9164 Cal. 373, 1 P. 15S6(1883).
22162 Va. 685, 174 S.E . 820 (1934).

It is interesting to note that appellee was present when both
resolutions were adopted and voted on them, and was a
member of a committee to arrange details and formulate
plans for issuing the invitation to stockholders to tender their
stock for sale to the corporation.
In other words, appellee, as a director and a member of
this committee, in effect said to the prior preference stockholders, if you will sell to the corporation forty per cent of
your stock, the remaining sixty per cent will still elect a majority of the directors, and hence will control the management of the corporation. He admits this, but claims that a
resolution of the directors would not and could not change
a charter provision. This is quite true. It was just as true
before the adoption of the resolutions as it was afterwards.
The action of the appellee in favoring the resolutions and
subsequent action in contesting their validity leaves his good
faith open to serious question.2
It is clear from the above cases that the legality of an election will not be inquired into upon the ground that illegal votes
were cast unless those votes were challeneged at the election.
In general, a relator seeking to set aside a corporate election
is barred from relief if he himself was guilty of misconduct or
neglect, or if it appears that he has subsequently acquiesced with
knowledge of the facts.. What has been overlooked here, however, is that the courts should be empowered to consider the
plaintiff's good faith with respect to his failure to make timely
objection. The degree of his responsibility may be so negligible
that his conduct may have been justified. It would seem that
under these circumstances greater leniency could be allowed.
The question arises as to who has the burden of proof in
attacking the validity of a vote. In the Indian Zeodone case24
it was determined that in attacking the validity of a vote the
burden of proof is on him who attacks. What is involved here
is basically the right of a stockholder to express himself and have
a bona fide right determined. Unfortuntely, not all claims of
stockholders are meritorious. Sometimes a stockholder is motivated by personal animosity toward a director, by a desire to
promote his own end to the detriment of the corporation, or by
Js 162 Va. 685, 702, 174 S.E. 820, 827 (1934).
I" re Indian Zeodone Co., L.R. 26 Ch.D. 70 (1884).
j,,

a misguided or over-zealous advocacy of quixotic schemes. By
placing the burden of proof as to validity of the vote on the contestor, a number of would be "strike suitors" who would frequently intrude in election suits would be deterred from participating in them. There is no Virginia case in point; but the
Virginia judges consultedas are in agreement with this rule. In
their opinion the burden of overcoming the presumption of the
validity of the vote should be on the contestor, and the party
attacking cannot complain if he is unable to prove the illegality
of the vote.
Significant difficulty has been encountered by stockholders
in other jurisdictions as to who is entitled to contest an election.
The general rule is that as between the corporation and the person offering to vote, the right follows the legal title to the stock
of which the certificates and stock books are prima facie evidence. 28 But may a person claiming stock which stands in the
name of another contest the validity of an election? It has been
held that even though a person claims stock which stands in
the name of another and might obtain such stock by a suit for
that purpose, yet the court will not consider this in a statutory
proceeding to contest the validity of an election, because only
the stockholders of record are entitled to vote.27 A reasonable
interpretation of the Virginia statute is that it would entitle stockholders whose rights have been infringed to complain and to
institute proceedings. Our Code Section28 provides that any
stockholder who may be aggrieved by an election for directors,
may, after giving reasonable notice to the corporation and any
other person who is to be affected, make application by petition
to the court. This Section, taken in conjunction with Code Section 13-193,29 which allows a corporation to provide for a different method of voting other than that based on record ownership,
indicates that the drafters of the Sections did not intend that only
shareholders of record would be entitled to contest an election.
A final hurdle that may confront a shareholder is the policy
openly expressed in Duffy v. Loft, Inc.30 and Attebury v. Con25 See note

14 supra.
Commonwealth v. Dalzell 152 Pa.St., 217, 25 A. 535 (1893).
A7In 'e Utica Fire Alarm Telegraph Co., 115 App.Div. 821, 101 N.Y.S. 109 (1906).
"8 Va. Code 513-205 (1950).
"9Va. Code §13-193 (1950).
s0 17 Del.Ch. 140, 151 A. 223, affirmed, 17 Del.Ch. 376, 152 A. 849 (1930).
10

solidated Coppermines Corp.,31 two landmark cases favoring the
finality of elections. In the words of the court in the Duffy case:
Where an extensive campaign has been carried on by rival
groups for the votes of stockholders . .. the parties . . .
should let the majority prevail. If... after the contest has
been waged one side defeats a decision by mere tactical
maneuvers, the whole business must be gone through32 again
with its consequences of expense and disturbances.
The policy adopted in these cases seems justifiable. There
seems to be no reason for a court to set aside an election where
every share of stock has been represented at the election. The
courts have followed the policy that an election will not be invalidated if it can be shown that after throwing out the invalid
votes the directors declared elected would still have, according
to the return, a valid majority of the votes cast.33 If Virginia were

to follow this trend, the broad provisions of the Statute would
not necessarily be defeated. The reasoning here is that even
if a new election were ordered the result would be the same;
therefore, the election should not be disturbed. Even though a
shareholder feels he has a worthy complaint, the court will not
consider the legality or illegality of votes when those votes will
not change the result. Of course, this rule has not been applied
to an election which is wholly illegal and without authority by
reason of the organization of the corporation not being complete. In this type of case the complaining stockholders need
not show that the results would be different in another election,
and in declaring the election illegal the court will not permit the
directors so elected to continue in office.34
The Virginia statute, 35 liberal in its provisions offers the
most effective means of contesting elections so as to prevent delay and expense. It provides a clear statutory relief for stockholders to litigate their grievances. It seems pertinent here to
comment upon the fact that the authors of the ProposedRevision
8 26 Del.Ch.

1, 20 A.2d 743 (1941).
12 17 Del.Ch. 140 .......
151 A. 223 228.
3 In re Chenango County Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wend. 635 (N.Y.Sup. 1839); State v.
Lehre, 7 Rich.Law 234 (S.C. 1854).
31 In re Empire State Supreme Lodge, 118 App.Div. 616, 103 N.Y.S. 465 (1907).
35 Va. Code §13-205 (1950).

of the Laws Relating to Corporations36 have failed to include
a comparable or substituted section in their draft. They are now
debating the omission of Virginia Code Section 13-205 altogether.37 A stockholder wishing to contest an election under the
proposed corporation law would be required to revert to the
old remedies. This would be a significant step backwards. The
old reliefs are encumbered with procedural difficulties, techniques and expense. For example, although a court may enjoin
an election, the title of de facto officers to their offices cannot
be tested by a bill in equity, but an additional proceeding by
quo warranto lies. A dissident stockholder would thus be burdened with double expense of money and time.
Under the present Virginia statute38 all grievances may be
litigated in one action. The court may enjoin an election, review
an election, oust the parties claiming to have been elected, or
make such order as it thinks necessary. It is a summary proceeding intended to be simple and inexpensive. The court may
exercise wide powers under this statute, and the strict rules as to
the reception of evidence do not apply. Judges may focus their
attention on the merits of the case rather than on the procedural
fastidiousness required by the old remedies. Because of this wide
discretion afforded the court and due to the clarity and unambiguity of the statute, the judges interviewed 39 recommend that
no amendments be made to the present Code Section.
In summation, the decided cases indicate certain precautions that should be taken by those who are contesting an election
in spite of the broad provisions offered by the statute. Possible
mistrust in the good faith of the complainants in delaying to
press their actions poses a plausible reason why courts refuse
relief. Strong suspicion understandably arises in the minds of
judges when such inertia exists. Fraud as a ground for invalidating an election must be specifically alleged and convincingly
proved; and generally an election will not be set aside unless
the evidence is clear and convincing. The problems of'burden of
86 Code

Commission of Virginia, Proposed RevisioI of the Laws Relating to Corporations
(1955). This draft is under consideration by the Code Commission but has not as
syet been approved by it.
SCorrespondence
with Secial Counsel, Code Commission of Virginia, May 2, 1955.
Va. Code §13-205 (1950)
a9 See note 14 supra.

proof and the possibility of a claim being denied because of misconduct, neglect, or acquiescence in regard to an election, while
not unnecessarily restrictive, certainly present difficulties that
the contestor must overcome.
The problems facing stockholders in contesting an election
in no way detract from the efficiency of the statutory procedure.
While a few may be injured, the tendency of the statute is to sift
the bona fide from the sham suitors. The Virginia Code Section
by its provisions truly confirms, and evidence places beyond cavil,
the words of an eminent authority on corporation law with respect to similar statutes:
These statutes have proven to be among the wisest and best
that 40legislatures have ever enacted in regard to corpora-

tions.

Ann Elizabeth Calevas
[Editor's Note: As a result of reading Miss Calevas study
in proof-forma the Special Counsel for the Code Commission of
Virginia reconsidered the omission of Code Section 13-205 from
their PROPOSED REVISION OF THE LAWS RELATING TO
CORPORATIONS. They have recommended to the Commission
that it be retained "without any change of substance," but with
"some modernization and simplification of the language."]

40 2 Cook, Corporations 1691 (6th ed. 1908).

